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Laurence H. Tribet
Remember these things lost;
and under the vaulting roof of the cathedral
burn a candle to the memory.'
Baudelaire's Rave Parisien paints what is quite literally a still life
-a dreamscape of a metallic city where groves of colonnades stand in
the place of trees and, in the place of water, pools of lead.2 More pro-
saic but no less unnerving was the recent decision by Los Angeles
County officials to install more than 900 plastic trees and shrubs in
concrete planters along the median strip of a major boulevard.3 The
construction of a new box culvert, it seemed, had left only 12 to 18
inches of dirt on the strip, insufficient to sustain natural trees.4
County officials decided to experiment with artificial plants con-
structed of factory-made leaves and branches wired to plumbing pipes,
covered with plastic and "planted" in aggregate rock coated with
epoxy.' Although a number of the trees were torn down by unknown
vandals" and further plantings were halted, 7 the tale may not be over.
For an article in Sciences suggested recently that, just as advertising
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. Brower, in TIME AND THE RivEa FLOWING 159 (F. Leydet ed. 1968) (writing of
a great cavern, submerged during Lake Powell's creation in June, 1965, that had once
been called the Cathedral in the Desert).
2. C. I3AUDELAIRE, Rgve Parisien, in Las FLURS DU MAL 129, 347 (1955).
3. See L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1972, § 2, at 6, col. 2. Plastic birds were subsequently
added by unknown persons. See L.A. Times, Mar. 14, 1972.
4. See L.A. Times, Feb. 6, 1972. It may be that the decision to use plastic trees was
also connected with the difficulty of sustaining natural plant life in the polluted at-
mosphere of Los Angeles County. See Chicago Tribune, Feb. 22, 1972, § 1, at 18, col.
2. ("Their admittedly logical argument is that little else will survive in that smogladen
climate and that a plastic tree is more attractive than a dead and rotting one.")
5. See L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1972.
6. See L.A. Times, Mar. 1, 1972.
7. See L.A. Times, Feb. 22, 1972.
8. Krieger, What's Wrong with Plastic Trees?, 179 SCIENCE 446 (1973).
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can lead people to value wilderness and nature, so too it can "create
plentiful substitutes."9 "The demand for rare environments is . . .
learned," the Science article observes, and "conscious public choice
can manipulate this learning so that the environments which people
learn to use and want reflect environments that are likely to be avail-
able at low cost .... Much more can be done with plastic trees and
the like to give most people the feeling that they are experiencing
nature."10
While so explicit an acknowledgment of the acceptability of arti-
ficial environments may be unusual, the attitude it expresses toward
the natural order is far from uncommon. Increasingly, artificial ob-
jects and settings supplait those supplied by nature. Durable Astro-
turf replaces grass in football stadiums and around swimming pools."
Guests at the Hyatt Regency hotel in San Francisco walk among more
than 100 natural trees growing in the 20-story lobby but listen to
recorded bird calls broadcast from speakers hidden in the tree
branches.' 2 And Walt Disney World offers a multitude of visitors
what one Newsweek writer described as "a programmed paradise."' 3
I do not focus on Astroturf and the plastic trees of Los Angeles
as harbingers of our most urgent environmental problems. Although
the long-term prospects in this regard are probably more troublesome,
I claim no imminent risk that we will too cleverly engineer ourselves
into a synthetic hell. Quite apart from any such danger, I believe
that such "nature surrogates" provide an illuminating metaphor
through which to expose and criticize certain premises which underlie
most current discussions of environmental thought, law, and policy.
While it might appear initially that nature surrogates would be
antithetical to the ecological concern embodied in present environ-
mental legislation and policy, a closer analysis leads to precisely the
9. Id. at 451.
10. Id. at 451, 453. Thus, when Roland Barthes saw in plastic "the stuff of alchemy"
and in its ubiquity the message that "the whole world can be plasticized," he foretold
more than he could have known. R. BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 97-99 (A. Layers transl. 1972).
11. The virtues of AstroTurf are amply extolled in Monsanto's advertising:
At last, the work-free poolsidel Simply install 'Round-the-Home AstroTurf . . . it
gives your poolside the look of lush grass, right up to the water's edge. Besides
being bright, beautiful, durable and fade resistant, 'Round-the-Home AstroTurf is
also easy to maintain-simply wash it with a hose ....
Monsanto Co. advertisement (on file with the Yale Law Journal).
12. Press release from Hyatt Regency San Francisco, May 8, 1973 ("Along the
south side of the lobby runs a 130-foot long rock-lined 'babbling brook,' backed by
a huge planter of shrubbery and live trees. Also located in this section of the lobby
is a unique 'sound sculpture' . . . . Stereophonic speakers concealed in the foliage
simulate the sound of songbirds flitting through the atrium.") (on file with the
Yale Law Journal).
13. Morgenstern, What Hath Disney Wrought!, NEwswaax, Oct. 18, 1971, at 38.
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opposite conclusion. The perpetually green lawn and the plastic tree,
far from representing the outcroppings of some inexplicable human
perversion, are expressions of a view of nature fully consistent with
the basic assumptions of present environmental policy. These assump-
tions, which are implicit in developing uses of policy analysis as well
as in emerging institutional structures, make all environmental judg-
ment turn on calculations of how well human wants, discounted over
time, are satisfied.
This article will attempt to identify the roots and expose the in-
adequacies of this homocentric perspective and will tentatively out-
line the shape of an alternative foundation for environmental law.
I. The Limits of Analytic Sophistication: Nature and Reason in the
Service of Man
Despite occasional probes in less familiar directions, 14 the emerging
field of environmental law is being built on the basic platform of
analytic sophistication in the service of human need. Statutes' 5 and
judicial decisions'0 typically mandate "systematic" and "interdiscipli-
nary" attempts to "insure that presently unquantified environmental
amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in de-
cisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations."' 7
Public interest challenges to decisions alleged to be environmentally
unsound are diverted by the pressures of doctrine and tradition from
claims about the value of nature as such into claims about interfer-
ence with human use,' 8 even when the real point may be that a par-
ticular wilderness area, for example, should be "used" by no-one.' 9
A. Technical Capacities and Limitations
1. Fragile Values
From the start, the aspect of environmental policy analysis that has
most concerned students of the matter has been the supposed diffi-
14. See, e.g., Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights For Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
15. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
16. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
17. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 §§ 102(2)(A), 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4332(2)(A), 4332(2)(B) (1970).
18. See. e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
19. See, e.g., 405 U.S. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 755 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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culty of ever incorporating certain kinds of values into systematic
analyses of environmental problems, whether in the service of legis-
lators, of planning agencies, of litigators, of private enterprises, or of
courts.2 0 Variously described as fragile, intangible, or unquantifiable,
these values have been widely thought to possess peculiar features
making them intrinsically resistant to inclusion along with such al-
legedly "hard" concerns as technical feasibility and economic effi-
ciency. In particular, those dimensions of a choice for which market
prices do not exist have seemed to pose intractable obstacles to "ob-
jective measurement."
It does not take long to discover, however, that this emphasis on
categorizing fragile values embodies a misleading formulation of the
problem and an inadequate appreciation of the analytic capacities
latent in the techniques under examination. To be sure, the aspira-
tions of some policy analysts to an elusive "objectivity, ' 21 the identity
of their constituents, 22 and the advocacy role often expected of them
by their clients, 23 induce certain practitioners to overlook or under-
stress a variety of values that might, in context, be characterized as
"fragile." More specifically, insofar as analysis is intended to help a
decisionmaker persuade others of the justifiability and wisdom of his
choice,24 its usefulness in the absence of consensus as to goals is pre-
dictably reduced whenever it does not at least appear to point "ob-
20. In assessing the tendencies of contemporary thought with respect to analytic
methods and their place in environmental policy, I am relying only in part upon
the published literature. For my views on these matters have been shaped not only
by such literature but also by a series of meetings and discussions sponsored by the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences under the auspices of the National Science
Foundation, which have aimed at investigating the complex interactions of analysis
and values in environmental decisionmaking. Those discussions took place from 1970
through 1973 and involved two dozen persons from fields as diverse as nuclear physics,
the history of religion, systems analysis, and ecology. A version of this article is scheduled
to appear as a chapter in a book I am editing for the American Academy on the subject
of values and environment.
21. See Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 66, 84
(1972) ("[s]eeking to limit himself to matters about which he can be 'completely ob-
jective,' the policy analyst who must compare two alternative courses of action first
focuses on the consequences of each alternative . . . and then on objectively com-
parable features of those consequences ... ') [hereinafter cited as Policy Science],
in BENEFIT-CosT AND POLICY ANALYSIS 1972, AN ALDINE ANNUAL ON FORECASTING, DE-
CISION-MAKING, AND EVALUATION 3-47 (W. Niskanen, A. Harberger, R. Haveman, R.
Turvey & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1972) [hereinafter cited as ALDINE ANNUAL].
22. See Policy Science, supra note 21, at 104 ("[q]uite obviously, the only values that
can be served [by the analyst who accepts his client's ends as given] will be those
strongly held by persons who seek a policy analyst's aid.").
23. See Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits
of Instrumental Ratidnality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 627 (1973) ("[policy] analysis is
often intended not only to aid the decisionmaker in choosing a course of action, but
also to help him in persuading others of the justifiability and wisdom of his choice.")
[hereinafter cited as Technology Assessment].
24. See Keeney & Raiffa, A Critique of Formal Analysis in Public Decision Making,
in ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC SYsTEMs 64 (A. Drake, R. Keeney & P. Morse eds. 1972).
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jectively" and unambiguously toward a particular alternative. The
users of policy-analytic techniques in advocacy situations are thus un-
der constant pressure to reduce the many dimensions of each problem
to some common measure in terms of which "objective" comparison
seems possible-even when this means squeezing out "soft" but cru-
cial information merely because it seems difficult to render commen-
surable with the "hard" data in the problem.2  These tendencies are
aggravated by the institutional and legal contexts in which analytic
techniques are ordinarily used: Such techniques tend to be deployed
as tools only by the individual combatants in policy conflicts; thus
the only values consistently served are those strongly felt by persons
motivated and able to seek a policy analyst's aid-a circumstance likely
to exclude values too widely diffused over space, or too incrementally
affected over time, to be strongly championed by any single client of
a policy analyst; values associated primarily with persons not yet in
being (future generations); and values not associated with persons at
all (for example, the "rights" of plants or animals).
Having said all of this, however, one must concede that there is
nothing in the structure of the techniques themselves, or in the logical
premises on which they rest, which inherently precludes their intelli-
gent use by a public decisionmaker in the service of these "intangible,"
or otherwise "fuzzy," concerns.26 Despite what appears to be a widely
held assumption to the contrary, all such concerns can in theory be
incorporated in a rigorous analysis, either by using various market
price or other numerical surrogates to value extramarket costs or
benefits, 27 or by the technique of "shadow pricing"-that is, qualita-
tively describing as best one can the contents of a constraint as intan-
gible as natural beauty or procedural fairness or respect for future
generations, and then calculating the tangible benefits that would have
to be forgone if one were to insist that one's policy conform to the
constraint described.
28
Thus, even in the relatively unsophisticated (by current standards)
cost-benefit analyses performed to evaluate alternative levels of water
quality improvement in the Delaware estuary, the enhanced swim-
ming, fishing, and boating possibilities of a cleaner Delaware River
25. Cf. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1361-65, 1389-90 (1971) (discussion of the "dwarfing of soft variables").
26. See Policy Science, supra note 21, at 90-93, 106; Technology Assessment, supra
note 23, at 630, 632-33.
27. See, e.g., Knetsch, Economics of Including Recreation as a Purpose of Eastern
Water Projects, 46 J. FARM ECON. 1148, 1150 (1964).
28. See McKean, The Use of Shadow Prices, in PROBLEIS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
ANALYSIS 33, 47-48 (S. Chase ed. 1968).
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were translated into dollar terms. The methods used in that transla-
tion were highly questionable in their ability to measure the econom-
ically relevant variables (that is, to measure how much prospective
swimmers, fishermen, and boaters would willingly sacrifice before
becoming indifferent between the enhanced opportunities caused by
an improvement and the opportunities previously available to them),29
and it is true that those variables themselves could not measure the
value of enhanced water quality to future generations, or to the
aquatic life that inhabits the estuary.30 But an observer who believes
that such values also matter could describe their significance in any
terms that seem appropriate, and the analyst could then calculate
how costly it would be to raise the water quality to the level de-
manded by the observer's description.31 Whether the sacrifice was
justified by the values invoked would then have to be determined by
whichever individuals or groups were responsible for making the
choice in question. That their decision would be a difficult one re-
flects not any intrinsic weakness of the analytic methodology as applied
to nonmonetizable values but rather the universal difficulty of choos-
ing among incommensurables, a difficulty that can be obscured but
never wholly eliminated by any method of decisionmaking.
It should be added as a qualifying caveat, however, that the tools of
analysis are currently too blunt to be of very great use in this en-
deavor. If the analytic disciplines are truly to clarify the relations
within and among values so as to identify inconsistencies not other-
wise perceived and to show that some perceived conflicts are in fact
illusory by inventing "policies from which two groups with appar-
ently conflicting interests can both benefit,"3 2 then the analytic fields,
and the scientific disciplines which support them, must sharpen both
their capacity to ask and answer probing and imaginative "what if"
questions, and their capacity to understand and describe in some de-
tail what each of the nonmonetary values significantly involved in a
choice really represents.
Organizations engaged in environmental policy analyses are rarely
able today to discover or to articulate the underlying character of the
29. See B. ACKERMAN, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, chs. 7-8
(forthcoming 1974).
30. See generally Stone, supra note 14.
31. More precisely, the analyst could compute a joint probability distribution
identifying the likelihood of each level of cost, and each level of improvement, that
the strategy might involve.
32. H. Brooks, What is Technology Assessment?, Dec. 12, 1972, at 8 (UNESCO
Paper on file with the Yale Law Journal). See also C. SCHULTZE, THE POLITICS AND
ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC SPENDING 74-75 (1968); Policy Science, supra note 21. at 99;
Technology Assessment, supra note 23, at 626-27 & n.32, 635 & n.60.
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ecological and aesthetic concerns, many of them essentially symbolic,
that play so major a role in environmental disputes or to design the
models that would be needed to facilitate a thorough search of even
mildly novel alternatives. It may be, as Nobel laureate Murray Gell-
Mann has proposed 3 3 that we must therefore develop a new group of
professionals sensitive to the sorts of values and issues that analyses
currently tend to slight-diversity, balance, aesthetic quality, reversi-
bility, the claims of the future-and adept at modeling policy impacts
in terms of such values. In studying a particular environmental case,
such professionals might translate each of the relevant values or con-
cerns into a parameterized constraint designed to show how costly the
options for choice would be from the perspective of the value in
issue. Thus, for example, a "distortion of natural landscape"34 index
might be studied to determine how slowly or rapidly the other costs
associated with a project would rise if that index were constrained
within lower and lower levels; an "ecological diversity" index might
be examined to ascertain what increments in various cost curves would
result as one tightened the ecological constraint by forcing this index
ever higher.
The curves generated by this sort of analysis will at times have a
more complex structure than those typically assumed by analysts,
especially those trained primarily in neoclassical economics. For ex-
ample, most individuals would probably not trade breathing rights
below a certain point for even limitless rights to pollute. And many
persons-far from regarding such human capacities as eyesight, hear-
ing and physical mobility as all subject to continuous trade-offs to
levels approaching zero-probably have preference orderings that dis-
play significant discontinuities, lexicalities,35 and nonzero thresholds
which an adequate analysis would be forced to consider.3 0
33. Conversation with author, in Santa Monica, Cal., Dec. 7, 1971.
34. See R. d'Arge, Economic Policies, Environmental Problems and Land Use: A
Discussion of Some Issues and Strategies in Research, July 25-Aug. 5, 1972, at 14
(Background Paper for NSF Conference on Research Needs in Planning Our Physical
Environment, Boulder, Colo., on file with the Yale Law Journal).
35. A list of goods L1, L2 ..... etc., is "lexically ordered" for a decisionmaker
in the sense here employed if the decisionmaker, in comparing any pair of alterna-
tives A, and A2 , would not consider it relevant whether A, or A, provided more of
L1.+ unless A, and A, could both be shown to provide a specified threshold level
T, of the good L,; if only A1 were to provide level T, of the good L, the decision-
maker would prefer A 1 to A2 however much A. might exceed A, with respect to the
good L,,. See Hausner, Multidimensional Utilities, in DEcisioN PROCESSES 167-80 (R.
Thrall, C. Coombs & R. Davis eds. 1954); P. Fishburn, Lexicographic Orders, Utilities
and Decision Rules: A Survey, Aug. 1972 (unpublished paper on file with the Yale
Law Journal).
36. See Policy Science, supra note 21, at 88-93. Among the most serious of the
difficulties the analyst would face-and it is a difficulty that economic analyses of
"rights" have invariably overlooked-is that being "assigned" a right on grounds es-
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However difficult the investigation of such ordering structures
might be, and however complex may be the general task of defining
the relevant parameterized constraints and generating the associated
curves, the effort to move analysis in such directions should at least
prove illuminating. And even before anyone is very good at the task
of attaching shadow prices to varying levels of constraints as elusive
as ecological diversity, the attempt to attach them rather than simply
incorporating such constraints in an all-or-nothing fashion should lead
to better decision processes even if not better outcomes. Whether or
not new professions must be developed in order to perform this sort
of task sensitively, it seems clear that treating the problem as an in-
herent incapacity of analysis to incorporate the intangible can only
retard the needed development of these important abilities.
2. Conflicting Goals
A second common formulation of the limits of environmental analy-
sis has centered on the alleged difficulty of systematically dissecting
problems characterized by a multiplicity of partially or wholly con-
flicting goals. Analytic techniques can be of virtually no use, it has at
times been suspected, outside the few situations (rarely encountered
in the environmental field) where one is optimizing a single, well-
defined objective subject to agreed-upon constraints."T It is true that
many analytic methods prove most powerful in the single objective
case38 and that various pressures tempt both analyst and client, how-
ever misleadingly, to reduce all the dimensions of a question to a com-
mon denominator (such as "net benefits," as in the case of the Dela-
ware estuary analysis) or at least to smoothly exchangeable attributes,39
but the temptation is one that has at times been resisted. The exist-
ence of that temptation, while properly a source of caution in the
application of analytic techniques to environmental problems, cannot
warrant a conclusion that those techniques are useless, or even that
they are invariably more dangerous than helpful.
sentially reducible to arguments from efficiency with respect to the relevant cost curves
might well fail to satisfy peculiarly human needs that can be met only by a shared
social and legal understanding that the right (e.g., a right to breathe or to see) be-
longs to the individual because the capacity it embodies is organically and historically
a part of the person that he is and not for any purely contingent and essentially
managerial reason. See id. at 87 n.54, 88-89 & n.56; Technology Assessment, supra
note 23, at 629-30 & n.44.
37. See, e.g., A. RIVLIN, SYSTEMATIC THINKING FOR SOCIAL ACTION 7 (1971); Schlesinger,
Uses and Abuses of Analysis, in PROGRAM BUDGETING AND BENEFIT-CoST ANALYSIS 346,
355 (H. Hinrichs & G. Taylor eds. 1969).
38. See Technology Assessment, supra note 23, at 627.
39. See id.; Policy Science, supra note 21, at 84-97.
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The approach of displaying a multitude of perspectives, with a dis-
tinct objective function defined for each,40 has often been proposed-
sometimes vaguely4l-but occasionally in a quite unambiguous and
operational form.42 Such techniques make it possible at least to ex-
pose for intelligent debate the trade-offs involved in various alterna-
tives, and sometimes even to suggest formerly unconsidered options
that would "score" well in terms of all the perspectives under exam-
ination. If techniques of this sort are augmented by bureaucratic and
organizational analyses43 that take into "account . . .realistically the
pluralistic milieu in which policy decisions are made and carried
out,"44 their predictive value-and hence, indirectly, their prescriptive
value as well-may prove to be considerable in environmental con-
troversies, particularly when we understand more thoroughly than
at present the bureaucratic politics peculiar to organizations with en-
vironment-related responsibilities4 and the behavioral dynamics of
the situations they routinely confront.
3. Means-Ends Fluidity
Yet a third tentative hypothesis regarding the limits of analysis has
been the possibility that, perhaps in environmental matters even more
than others, most people lack clearly articulable ends and values at
any given time and have only vague ideas about what they might re-
gard as desirable or undesirable; such inchoate values are crystallized
into distinct preferences or criteria of choice only through the con-
crete process of seeking means to attain them and gradually discover-
40. An "objective function" is a rule that associates with each potential choice a
single mathematically determined value by means of which the choice can be com-
paratively ranked with respect to a defined goal, objective or attribute-such as total
cost to a particular individual or group, or risk of death to another, or level of aes-
thetic enjoyment (however approximated) to still another.
41. See, e.g., the 1970 proposal of P. Self, discussed in Williams, Cost-Benefit
Analysis: Bastard Science? And/Or Insidious Poison in the Body Politick?, 1 J. Pua.
ECON. 199, 221-22 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bastard Science], in ALDINE ANNUAL,
supra note 21, at 70-71; Policy Science, supra note 21, at 107-08.
42. See, e.g., Dorfman & Jacoby, A Model of Public Decisions Illustrated by a Water
Pollution Policy Problem, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS 173 (R. Haveman
& J. Margolis eds. 1970). See also TECHNICAL COMaTfrr OF THE WATER RESOURCES
CENTERS OF THE THIRTEEN WVESTrERN STATES, FINAL REroRT-PROJECr C-2194, WATER
RESOURCES PLANNING AND SOCIAL GOALS: CONCEIrUALIzATIoN TOWARD A NiEW METHIOD-
OLOGY 9-32, 45-49 (1971).
43. See, e.g., G. ALLIsON, ESSENCE OF DECISION (1971); Wildavsky, The Political Econ-
omy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting, 26
PUB. AD. REV. 292 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Political Economy].
44. H. Brooks, A Framework for Science and Technology Policy, vol. SMC-2 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS, No. 5, at 584, 586 (Nov. 1972).
45. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 29. Professor Ackerman makes a useful start to-
ward such understanding in Chapters 10, 11, and 14.
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ing what such means entail. There is no "spook . . . which posits
values in advance.;
46
The fluid character of means-ends relationships has long been postu-
lated,47 and I have elsewhere argued that it ordinarily describes the
actual situation not only during the process of choice but in its im-
plementation as well.48 Indeed, I would hypothesize that most of the
crucial environmental choices confronting industrialized nations in
the last third of the 20th century will be choices that significantly
shape and do not merely implement those nations' values with respect
to nature and wilderness. Such choices will do more than generate a
distribution of pay-offs and penalties to the persons affected in terms
of their preexisting yardsticks of cost and benefit. Choices of this type
will also greatly alter the experiences available to the affected persons,
the concomitant development of their preferences, attitudes, and cost-
benefit conceptions over time, and hence their character as a society of
persons interacting with one another and with the natural order.49
The hypothesis of such means-ends fluidity may, however, say little
more than that the choice and implementation of means have some
"feedback" effects upon the chooser's ends.50 Indeed, the fluidity hy-
pothesis seen in terms of feedback effects renders systematic analysis
all the more valuable as a means of bringing ends to light, and all the
more essential inasmuch as wholly intuitive approaches to decision
might overlook the means-ends complexity that a more rigorous in-
vestigation could help to illuminate.51
The need again is not for an abandonment of rigor and precision
but rather for its enrichment-this time by encouraging closer study
of the range of psychological and sociological mechanisms, including
46. Political Economy, supra note 43, at 308.
47. The appearance of this notion in the policy science literature may be traced to
Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, PuB. AD. REv. 79 (1959), but it was of
course noted much earlier by Mill, Dewey and others.
48. See Policy Science, supra note 21, at 99-100; Technology Assessment, supra note
23, at 634-35, 642-50.
49. This theme is of course a familiar one in Marxist thought, see, e.g., V. CHILDE,
MAN MAKES HIMsF.F (1936), though it is by no means alien even to English liberalism,
see, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL ON BENTHAM AND COLERIDGE 72-74 (F. Leavis ed. 1950). The
usual Marxist analysis is that individuals and societies are transformed by entering
into the altered patterns of production created by new technologies. The sort of trans-
formation contemplated here includes the latter but may also go deeper, for it may
involve a radical reshaping of the constitutive elements (e.g., physical characteristics,
mental capacities, ultimate ends and self-conceptions) of human identity itself. De-
veloping a typology of modes, both direct and indirect, through which technologies of
various types (e.g., productive, informational, biomedical) can "reconstitute" humanity
is beyond the scope of this essay.
50. See Bastard Science, supra note 41, at 217. The hypothesis may also involve a
statement that "values" and "ends" are not "things out there" but merely conven-
tional summaries of how people in fact behave.
51. See Technology Assessment, supra note 23, at 637 n.74.
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self-perception 52 and cognitive dissonance,53 through which the ends
held by individuals and groups are shaped by the questions they ask,
the intentions they form, the processes of choice they adopt, and the
choices they in fact make. Even the most sophisticated analyses of
environmental issues have been oddly oblivious to this problem of
variable ends and shifting values, 54 in part no doubt because our un-
derstanding of value formation is so rudimentary. But failing alto-
gether to take this sort of dependence into account can only result in
solving an unintended problem while leaving unsolved the problem
initially put-rather like firing at a moving target that is connected
to the marksman's arm without paying any attention to the link
between the two.
Having considered the most serious technical obstacles to "good"
environmental analysis and planning, one is therefore forced to con-
clude that none of these obstacles need prove insuperable: Each calls
essentially for further research in preparation for more sensitive analy-
ses and both greater creativity and closer vigilance in whatever en-
vironmental analyses are in fact conducted.
B. Ideological Boundaries
A final obstacle remains. Policy analysts typically operate within a
social, political and intellectual tradition that regards the satisfaction
of individual human wants as the only defensible measure of the good,
a tradition that perceives the only legitimate task of reason to be that
of consistently identifying and then serving individual appetite, pref-
erence, or desire. 5 This tradition is echoed as well in environmental
legislation which protects nature not for its own sake but in order to
preserve its potential value for man.56
52. See, e.g., Bem, Self-Perception: An Alternative Interpretation of Cognitive Dis-
sonance Phenomena, 74 PSYCH. REv. 183 (1967); Bern, Inducing Belief in False Con-
fessions, 3 J. PERS. & SoC. PSYCH. 707 (1966); Schachter & Singer, Cognitive, Social, and
Psychological Determinants of Emotional State, 69 PSYCH. REV. 379 (1962); Valins, Cog-
nitive Effects of False Heart-Rate Feedback, 4 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 400 (1966).
53. See L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
54. Even those studies, such as Wildavsky's Political Economy, supra note 43, which
recognize that goals are not "given" but emerge in the process of analysis and choice,
strangely ignore the dependence of ends on the means actually chosen and imple-
mented and on the experiences that result.
55. See M. HORKHEIMER, ECLIPSE OF REASON 3-57 (1947).
56. In National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)
(1970), Congress defined the goals of national environmental policy as follows:
In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent
with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate
Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may-
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment
for succeeding generations;
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By treating individual human need and desire as the ultimate frame
of reference, and by assuming that human goals and ends must be
taken as externally "given" (whether physiologically or culturally or
both) rather than generated by reason, environmental policy makes
a value judgment of enormous significance. And, once that judgment
has been made, any claim for the continued existence of threatened
wilderness areas or endangered species must rest on the identification
of human wants and needs which would be jeopardized by a disputed
development. As our capacity increases to satisfy those needs and
wants artificially, the claim becomes tenuous indeed.
Consider again the plastic trees planted along a freeway's median
strip by Los Angeles county officials. If the most sophisticated appli-
cation of the techniques of policy analysis could unearth no human
need which would, after appropriate "education," be better served
by natural trees, then the environmental inquiry would be at an end.
The natural trees, more costly and vulnerable than those made of
plastic, would offer no increment of satisfaction to justify the added
effort of planting and maintaining them.
To insist on the superiority of natural trees in the teeth of a con-
vincing demonstration that plastic ones would equally well serve
human purposes may seem irrational. Yet the tendency to balk at the
result of the analysis remains. There is a suspicion that some crucial
perspective has been omitted from consideration, that the conclusion
is as much a product of myopia as of logic.
II. Beyond Human Wants: A New Rationale
for Environmental Policy
What has been omitted is, at base, an appreciation of an ancient and
inescapable paradox: We can be truly free to pursue our ends only if
we act out of obligation, the seeming antithesis of freedom. To be free
is not simply to follow our ever-changing wants wherever they might
lead. To be free is to choose what we shall want, what we shall value,
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and cul-
turally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degra-
dation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national
heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports di-
versity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit
high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum
attainable recycling of depletable resources.
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and therefore what we shall be.57 But to make such choices without
losing the thread of continuity that integrates us over time and im-
parts a sense of our wholeness in history, we must be able to reason
about what to choose-to choose in terms of commitments we have
made to bodies of principle which we perceive as external to our
choices and by which we feel bound, bodies of principle that can de-
fine a coherent and integrative system even as they evolve with our
changing selves.58
To deny the existence of such bodies of principle is fashionable,
but it is not inevitable. However obvious, it is worth recalling that
most of the great philosophical systems of our own past-those of Plato
and Aristotle, of Aquinas and the Scholastics, of Hegel and the Ideal-
ists-were grounded in the view that the highest purpose of human
reason is to evolve a comprehensive understanding of mankind's
place in the universe, not merely to serve as a detector of consistency
and causality and thus as an instrument for morally blind desire.
"The emphasis," as Horkheimer reminds us, "was on ends rather than
on means." It is only recently that the concept of reason as calcula-
tion without content became central in the West-that reason began
to liquidate itself "as an agency of ethical, moral, and religious in-
sight."60 Unless we are to remain in the shadow of that intellectual
eclipse, we cannot simply assume that we must stand mute when con-
fronting the ultimate question of whether we want our children, and
their children's children, to live in, and enjoy, a plastic world.
The notion that nature in particular embodies values apart from
its usefulness in serving man's desires is familiar even in the Western
post-Enlightenment tradition. Kant, for example, taught that a pro-
pensity to exploit or destroy nonhuman and inanimate nature might
violate a person's duty to himself. 61 Such utilitarian philosophers as
57. Cf. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL.
5, 7-14 (1971).
58. See Technology Assessment, supra note 23, at 652-54. As I sought to show in
Technology Assessment, such reasoned commitments can be shaped only in communi-
ties of persons whose shared experiences and understandings facilitate a common groping
toward communal ends. See also R. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 229-32, 235-37,
241-47, 264-71, 276-79 (1953). This is so in part for contingent reasons-because it
seems unlikely in this period of history that the search for ends can generate fruitful
and convincing conclusions when pursued by isolated individuals-and in part as a
matter of definition, because the wholeness that in fact seems threatened by freedom
in the choice of ends is wholeness among persons (community) as well as wholeness
over time (continuity). See Technology Assessment at 651 n.118.
59. M. HORKHEIMER, ECLIPSE OF REASON 5 (1947).
60. Id. at 18.
61. I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE §§ 16-17, at 105-06 (J.
Ellington transl. 1964). ("A propensity to the bare destruction . . . of beautiful
though lifeless things in nature is contrary to man's duty to himself. For such
a propensity weakens or destroys that feeling in man . . . which . . . does much to
promote a state of sensibility favorable to morals .... ")
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Bentham advanced a related view, perceiving human obligations as ex-
tending to all entities capable of experiencing pleasure and pain.0 2 And
the contemporary philosopher John Rawls, after restricting his own
theory of justice to the human sphere, 63 went on to assert that it is
"[c]ertainly... wrong to be cruel to animals and the destruction of a
whole species can be a great evil." 64 Concluding that a correct concep-
tion of man's relation to nature "would seem to depend upon a theory
of the natural order and our place in it," Rawls has exhorted meta-
physics to work out a world view suited to this purpose, identifying
and systematizing "the truths decisive for these questions." 65
The task which Rawls thereby defined will not easily be accom-
plished, either as an intellectual matter or as an institutional one.
From the perspective of a social order in which law has come to be
justified either in purely formal, positivist terms (as the command of
the recognized sovereign), 66 or in terms of a projected tendency to
maximize aggregate human satisfaction over time,6 7 or in terms of a
contractarian conception of justice as fairness to other human beings, 8
62. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION,
ch. XVII, § 1, 4, at 273 n.330 (Doubleday ed. 1961). Bentham explicitly extends utili-
tarian ethics to man's relationship with lower animals:
But is there any reason why we should be suffered to torment [animals]? Not
any that I can see. Are there any why we should not be suffered to torment
them? Yes, several. . . . The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is
not yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of
slaves, have been treated by the law exactly upon the same footing as, in England
for example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day may come, when the
rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have
been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already
discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should
be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor . . . . It may come
one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin,
or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning
a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuper-
able line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a
full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more
conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old.
But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not,
Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?
Id. at 381.
Research indicating that plants display physiological reactions analogous to the
"pain" reactions of animals would provide a theoretical basis for extending Bentham's
theory to the plant kingdom. See pp. 134445 infra.
63. J. RAWtLs, A THEORY OF JUsTcE 512 (1971).
64. Id.
65. Id. See also Hampshire, Morality and Pessimism, THE NEW YORK REviEw, Jan.
25, 1973, at 26.
66. See, e.g., Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55
HARv. L. REV. 44, 59 (1941). ("To say that an individual is legally obligated to ob-
serve certain conduct means that a legal norm provides a sanction for contrary be-
havior, a delict.")
67. See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, supra note 62, ch. XIII, § I, 1, at 162. ("The general
object which all laws have, or ought to have, in common, is to augment the total
happiness of the community .... ")
68. See, e.g., J. RAWLs, supra note 63, at 350-55.
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the elaboration of human obligations to nature is likely to appear
idiosyncratic at best and incoherent at worst. Although legislators and
jurists might concede the appeal of an ecological or evolutionary
theory which could suggest a conceptual basis for extrapolating be-
yond the homocentric perspective, 9 they would undoubtedly resist
efforts to incorporate any such extrapolation into a system of legal
protection. The widely held view that law exists for the purpose of
ordering human societies, and for that purpose alone, may well prove
an unassailable article of faith.
Given the obvious difficulty of progressing against the grain of such
a faith, it seems appropriate to assess the importance of the task. How
serious is the distortion occasioned by an entirely homocentric, want-
regarding vision? In precisely what ways-apart from the basic affront
to freedom described earlier-is it troublesome to view nature solely
in terms of potential human satisfaction? In short, what's wrong with
plastic trees, if that's what people really want?
A. The Distortions Implicit in a Homocentric,
Want-Oriented Perspective
Theoretically at least, policy analyses and legislative provisions can
be so calibrated as to be sensitive to, and then to accommodate, what-
ever values individuals are capable of discerning70 Yet it does not
follow, simply because all values susceptible to human perception may
thus be formally "included" in our designs, that an institutional sys-
tem or an analytic technique which relentlessly treats all such values
as manifestations of individual human preference will prove satisfac-
tory. To reach such a conclusion would require another premise: that
the act of characterizing all values as expressions of human preference
does not affect their content or distort their perception. It is a premise
that does not withstand scrutiny. Treating all values as based on per-
sonal preferences results in a major shift of focus: Attention is no
longer directed to the ostensible content of the value but rather to
the fact that it is a more or less abstracted indicium of self-interest.
Even if one ultimately chooses the same actions under such a shift
of focus, one may well end with the feeling that one has chosen them
not out of obligation or for their own sake, but because their oppor-
tunity cost in terms of one's range of personal interests was low
69. An evolutionary theory might offer, in Rawls' terms, "a theory of the natural
order and our place in it." J. RAwLs, supra note 63, at 512.
70. See p. 1319 supra.
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enough, thereby distorting the meaning of the choice and of the ac-
tions chosen.7 1
To offer a simple illustration, suppose a person feels an obligation
to protect a wilderness area from strip mining. The initial perception
of that obligation is likely to take the form of sympathy for the wild-
life and vegetation which would be destroyed or displaced7 2 Indeed,
the perceived obligation may display at least the rudiments of an in-
ternal structure: Killing "higher" animal life may seem unjustifiable
except for compelling reasons (to sustain, or to avert a direct threat
to, human life, for instance); destroying plant life may seem improper
if destruction can be avoided without "undue" cost. Certain cate-
gories of harm which might leave human civilization intact while
threatening the global eco-system as a whole-severe radioactive con-
tamination of the oceans, for instance-may seem wrong regardless
of the strength of the countervailing human interest.
If the sense of obligation prompts the individual to undertake
some concrete effort on behalf of the environment, such as making an
adverse response to an environmental survey, initiating a suit to en-
join the strip mining, or advancing an argument in favor of preserva-
tion, a subtle transformation is likely to be occasioned by the philo-
sophical premises of the system in which the effort is undertaken.
The felt obligation will be translated into the terminology of human
self-interest: It may be said that future generations will be deprived
of contact with wildlife; that the aesthetic satisfaction of certain indi-
viduals will be diminished; that other recreational areas will become
overcrowded. Like Kant, proponents of environmental protection will,
at best, couch their disapproval of human mistreatment of nature in
terms of the indirect consequences for mankind.7 3
While the environmentalist may feel somewhat disingenuous in
taking this approach, he is likely to regard it as justified by the de-
mands of legal doctrine and the exigencies of political reality.7 4 What
the environmentalist may not perceive is that, by couching his claim
in terms of human self-interest-by articulating environmental goals
wholly in terms of human needs and preferences-he may be helping
71. See T. NAG.EL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM (1970). The necessity to relate
altruistic impulses to endogenous needs or wants of the object of altruism was recog-
nized by Rawls. See J. RAWLS, supra note 63, at 189. ("There is . . . a peculiar fea-
ture of perfect altruism that deserves mention. A perfect altruist can fulfill his desire
only if someone else has independent, or first-order, desires.")
72. See generally Stone, supra note 14, at 490.
73. See I. KANT, supra note 61, § 17, at 106. See also I. KANT, Duties Towards
Animals and Spirits, in LacrouRs ON ETHics 239 (L. Infield transl. 1963). ("Animals are
not self-conscious and are there merely as a means to an end. That end is man.")
74. See Stone, supra note 14, at 490.
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to legitimate a system of discourse which so structures human thought
and feeling as to erode, over the long run, the very sense of obliga-
tion which provided the initial impetus for his own protective efforts.
This metamorphosis of obligation into self-interest and personal
preference ironically echoes aspects of Mill's utilitarian theory. Mill
argued that the sense of moral obligation was a subjective feeling devel-
oped through learning and association from the primary responses of
pain aversion and pleasure maximization. 75 He discounted the pos-
sibility that obligation, when perceived as an accretion of such re-
sponses, might ultimately lose its compelling force and dissolve into
unmitigated self-aggrandizement; in Mill's view, the impulse toward
conformity and other social pressures would insulate ethical feelings
from any such reductionist tendency.76 However justifiable Mill's
faith in the efficacy of communal reinforcement in the context of
interpersonal obligation, the phenomenon clearly plays a less impor-
tant role when the occasion of an ethical impulse is not a member of
the human community but a natural object. Despite impassioned
efforts by ecologists to suggest the contrary, 77 the best interests of in-
dividual persons (and even of future human generations) are not
demonstrably congruent with those of the natural order as a whole,
even if such a congruence can be established as between individuals
and the human communities in which they live. Indeed, individually
or communally defined human interests may often be at odds with
the primal ethical impulse-the sense of duty beyond self-that gives
passion and conviction to many who see elements of the inviolable
in nature. In this situation, communal reinforcement, far from im-
peding the transformation of ethical obligation into a category of self-
interest, may actually accelerate the process.
To return to our example, once obligation has been transformed
into a mere matter of personal preference, the tendency is inevitable
to compare the value of wilderness with the value of strip mined coal
in terms of self-interest. From there, it is but a short step to an even
more blatantly reductionist approach: In order to insure that the
comparison is "rational," the two values will almost certainly be trans-
lated into smoothly exchangeable units of satisfaction, such as dol-
lars .7 While certain discontinuities may still be recognized-destruc-
tion of all wilderness areas may not be deemed worth even an infinite
75. See J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 433-34 (Dolphin ed. 1961).
76. Id. at 434.
77. See, e.g., B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE 41-45, 21649, 299-300 (1971); P.
EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT 1-3, 157, 182 (1970).
78. See Policy Science, supra note 21, at 84.
1331
The Yale Law Journal
supply of coal-they will tend to be gradually eroded by the pressure
toward analytic uniformity.
The translation of all values into homocentric terms thus creates
two distortions: First, an inchoate sense of obligation toward natural
objects is flattened into an aspect of self-interest; second, value dis-
continuities tend to be foreshortened. It is important to emphasize
again that these distortions do not follow as a necessary result from
the theoretical premises of policy analysis. Although Aaron Wildavsky
suggested in a 1966 critique that cost-benefit techniques structurally
presuppose the individualistic premise that only personal preferences
matter,79 it is obviously possible to compute the costs of an activity
in any terms one wishes or to impose whatever nonindividualistic
constraint is deemed important. There is nothing in the logic of ana-
lytic techniques (or, for that matter, the logic of interest identifica-
tion which precedes legislative enactment) that limits the use of such
methods to the tradition of liberal individualism in any of its diverse
forms.
The distortion occurs rather because the process of interest identifi-
cation, as it is presently employed, interacts in a crucial way with the
content of the interest being identified. The identification takes place
in the context of a system of attitudes and assumptions which treat
human want satisfaction as the only legitimate referent of policy analy-
sis and choice. These assumptions, and the desire for analytic clarity
which accompanies them, together exert an enormous reductionist
pressure on all values which would otherwise seem incommensurable
with a calculus of individual human wants. Thus the distortion re-
sults not from a logical flaw in the techniques of policy analysis but
rather from what I have elsewhere described 0 as the ideological bias
of the system in which such analysis is imbedded, a system that has
come to treat the human will and its wants as the center around which
reason as calculation must revolve.
B. The Roots of Our Current Posture
No one should suppose that this bias is a shallow one or that it can
readily be eliminated. Its roots lie deep within the Western philo-
sophical and theological tradition. It is important, therefore, to de-
scribe briefly certain aspects of this tradition even at the inevitable
expense of simplification. The dominant religious consciousness of
79. See Political Economy, supra note 43, at 294, 298.
80. See Policy Science, supra note 21, at 85.
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preindustrial Western societies, representing the confluence and cul-
mination of strands that began at points as diverse as the Near Eastern
salvation faiths and early Greek monotheism, is the consciousness of
transcendence. 8' That consciousness characteristically perceives God
as an other-worldly entity-one standing apart from, and above, the
world. Genesis proclaims the sovereignty of God over the physical
universe; it is but a small step to infer the dominion of man, as God's
representative on earth, over all of life. In a seminal lecture delivered
before the American Association for the Advancment of Science in
1966, Lynn White pointed to the Judeo-Christian tradition of tran-
scendence as the underlying basis for what he then perceived as our
ecological crisis.8 2 That thesis has been much criticized as overdrawn,
but it deserves elaboration in the present context.
Any society whose dominant consciousness posits the radical dichot-
omy between God and world, between heaven and earth, and (in the
individualized manifestations of these dualities) between soul and
body, is apt to regard natural and social phenomena as entirely ap-
propriate objects of human manipulation and will, at least insofar
as humanity is viewed by that society as uniquely participating in the
divine. So long as man is thought to stand apart from nature, and the
universally divine in individual man apart from his more particular
manifestation as a concrete social being, the manipulative stance to-
ward the world of physical processes and social structures, expressed
respectively through the media of "technology" and "public policy,"
is likely to prove invincible.8 3 And, as Max Weber has argued, there
exists a natural correspondence between manipulation as a mode of
conduct and instrumental rationality-the rationality of matching
means to ends-as a mode of thought.8 4 If man is pilot of the lower
orders, it is instrumental reason that charts his way.
The view that White's thesis was misguided rests on a facet of
Judeo-Christian theology whose centrality he failed to recognize. In
Summa Theologiae, Aquinas argued that man excels all animals not
by virtue of his power but rather by virtue of the faculty of reason
81. See, e.g., R. BELLAH, Transcendence in Contemporary Piety, in BEYOND BELIEF:
ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONAL WORLD 196-208 (1970); P. TILLICH, SYS-
TEMATIC THEOLOGY 360 (1967); L. White, The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,
155 SCIENCE 1203-05 (1967), in MACHINA Ex DEO: ESSAYS IN THE DYNAMISM OF WESTERN
CULTURE 75 (1968).
82. See L. White, supra note 81.
83. Some aspects of this thesis parallel the thought and writing of the Frankfurt
School. See generally M. JAY, THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION (1975).
84. See, e.g., M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISm 26-
27, 75-78, 155-74 (r. Parsons transl. 1958).
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through which he participates in the kingdom of heaven; White's
account seemingly left no room within the Judeo-Christian main-
stream for a divinely inspired stewardship of the sort suggested by
Aquinas and so eloquently realized in the thought of St. Francis.,,
But, if this is its limitation, White's thesis becomes chillingly plausible
in the period when the rise of science heralds the death of God. For
once one accepts the Baconian creed that scientific understanding can
only mean technological power over nature, one can no longer hope
for inspiration from beyond; 7 once reason is no longer perceived as
guided by the divine, it can no longer serve as master and must be
relegated to the place of slave. It is through this thoroughgoing secu-
larization of transcendence 8 that Hume's dictum-that "reason is,
and ought only to be the slave of the passions" 89-is fully realized;
for when God is absent, the "grand manipulator" must move the
world not according to values divinely revealed but in accord with
ends ultimately private to each person and empty of intrinsic signifi-
cance because not derived through any dialogue beyond the self.
In a classic reply to Sartre's heroic effort to find authenticity in this
very emptiness, 90 Heidegger saw in that existentialist stance only the
haunting specter of the human will willing itself in the void.91 The
age inaugurated for philosophy by Kant and carried to its relentless
conclusion by Nietzsche-the age of human will as the center of reality
-seemed to Heidegger to lack a center, a point of reference from which
the works of the will might be assessed. So it is that instrumental
rationality, the shadow in human thought of the manipulative pose
inherent in transcendent consciousness, is reduced to the endless striv-
ing after ever-changing ends that has come to characterize much of
contemporary life. So it is that progress becomes a frenzied caricature
of itself, and that human nature, itself but a part of the natural order
properly subject to human will, becomes subject to alteration without
moral constraint as Yeats' vision becomes reality: The center will not
hold.
85. T. AQUINAS, SUNIMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I; Quest. 3, Art. 1; Quest. 96, Art. 2
(Blackfriars transl. 1963).
86. White pointed to Saint Francis of Assisi as a model, praising his reverence for
Brother Ant and Sister Fire. but sought to show that the Franciscan Order was pro-
foundly heretical and did not grow naturally in the soil of Western Christianity. L.
White, supra note 81, at 1206-07.
87. See W. LEISs, THE DOMINATION OF NATURE 45-71 (1972).
88. See, e.g., K. MARX, On the Jewish Question, in WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX
ON PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY 216-48 (L. Easton & K. Guddat transls. and eds. 1967). The
theme of secularized transcendence and its significance in the liberal state is thought-
fully elaborated in R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (Free Press, forthcoming 1974i).
89. D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, bk. 11, pt. 3, § iii (Oxford ed. 1958).
90. J.P. SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM AND HUMANISM (P. Mairet transl. 1948).
91. M. HEIDEGGER, OBER DEN HUMANISMUS (1949).
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It is to the secularization of transcendence that we may most in-
structively correspond the transition from Aquinas and the Scholastics
to moral theorists in the tradition of contemporary liberal individual-
ism. Treating the work of John Rawls as representative, 92 one may
observe that the basic structure of his contractarian argument-which
seeks justice and just institutions in the arrangements he claims ra-
tional persons would freely choose under a veil of ignorance as to the
positions they will occupy in the world they are designing-presup-
poses an "individualistic conception according to which the best that
can be wished for someone is the unimpeded pursuit of his own path,
provided it does not interfere with the rights of others."93 While this
concept allows Rawls to elevate the sentiment of justice from its status
in utilitarianism as a "socially useful illusion"0 4 to an antecedent
principle of social behavior, it does not implicate directly man's rela-
tion to nature. As Rawls admits, duties imposed on persons by the
capacity of animals to experience pain and pleasure fall outside the
ambit of any contractarian doctrine.93
In Rawls' system, the good is no longer to be derived from first
principles by divinely inspired reason or by any rational faculty but
is the contractual composite of arbitrary (even if comprehensible)
values individually held and either biologically or socially shaped.
As was implicit in Kant, reason must be silent when confronting the
substantive and lonely task of commitment to the ends and values
themselves.
The structure of the Rawlsian argument thus corresponds closely
to that of instrumental rationality; ends are exogenous, and the ex-
clusive office of thought in the world is to ensure their maximum
realization, with nature as raw material to be shaped to individual
human purposes. Thus when Rawls posits that a correct conception
of man's relations to nature depends upon "a theory of the natural
order and our place in it,"96 he calls for a moral conception of eco-
logical obligation which cannot be formulated within the tradition
of his own thought. For the premises of secularized transcendence
92. J. RAWLS, supra note 63.
93. Nagel, Rawls on Justice, 82 PHIL. Rav. 220, 228 (1973).
94. J. RAwis, supra note 63, at 28.
95. Because the parties to the initial contract are assumed to be ignorant of their
particular conceptions of the good, id. at 137, they will seek only to maximize self-
ishly their shares of primary social goods, id. at 142-44, such as income, wealth, liberty,
power and opportunity, id. at 62. While the parties may seek "contractual" protection
for the environment in order to ensure a continuing flow of primary goods, see
generally id. at 137, they will ignore the noneconomic value of nature: Protecting
the environment for reasons other than enhancing its productivity will not lead to
higher individual quotients of primary goods.
96. J. RwLs, supra note 63, at 512.
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deny the existence of anything sacred in the world and reduce all
thought to the combined operations of formal reason and instru-
mental prudence in the service of desire. The only entities that can
"count" in a calculus of end-maximization, whether utilitarian or
contractarian, are those entities that possess their own systems of ends
or at least the capacity to experience pleasure and pain,9 7 and nothing
outside the private ends and pleasures of such beings can come to the
rescue of a philosophy devoted solely to their pursuit.
C. The Alternative of Immanence
How such a rescue might proceed is not easily imagined. Those
strands of our legal, intellectual and religious heritage that once
seemed to point the way toward reason as an agent of moral illumina-
tion now appear as dust, the task of reassembling them into a co-
herent fabric seemingly beyond our grasp. Despairing of anything
better-frightened with Pascal by "the eternal silence of these infinite
spaces"98 but unable with him to embrace God-we may be tempted
to accept a perfected form of formal and instrumental thought as
marking the perimeter of legitimate aspiration. In so doing we may,
as long as we have the courage, recognize the futility of the pursuit
after intrinsically empty ends to which we are thereby consigned.
It is worth asking, however, whether such stoic resignation is an
inescapable corollary of our contemporary situation. I would not pre-
sume to offer anything like a definitive answer, but I will advance a
tentative hypothesis: Just as the disintegration of reason detected by
Horkheimer 99 has its roots in a religious transformation, the reinte-
gration of reason and moral perception may be augured by the dawn-
ing of environmental awareness in contemporary law and culture.
Recall the observation that environmentalists often feel disingenu-
ous when they seek to rationalize their position in terms of a homo-
centric calculus, even one that gives more than the usual weight to
the interests of future human generations or one that takes an un-
usually risk-averse posture in assessing available options. Such en-
vironmentalists "want to say something less egotistic and more em-
phatic, but the prevailing and sanctioned modes of explanation in our
society are not quite ready for it."100
Those modes of explanation are not quite ready, but it is hard not
97. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 62, ch. XVII, § 1, 4, at 273 n.330.
98. B. PASCAL, PENSfES 95 (A. Krailsheimer transl. 1966).
99. See M. HORKHEIMER, supra note 59.
100. Stone, supra note 14, at 490.
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to observe a convergence of trends which suggests a growing sense
in contemporary industrialized societies that there is in fact something
sacred in the natural,' 0 ' a sense that Edward Shils has rightly argued
can be wholly secular.10 2 One sees such a notion, at the most romantic
extreme, in the fond longing for an imagined past of an unmech-
anized, decentralized, nonhierarchical, anti-technological community of
man in nature. 0 3 One sees essentially the same notion, at the oppo-
site social pole, in the idea (closely related to "natural law") that
modern science itself, and the unfolding structural truths it reveals
about the natural order and the human condition,10 4 can somehow
be the source of moral wisdom-the idea that existence, deeply and
richly enough understood, might somehow imply sanctity.'0 5
There would be great danger, however, in transforming these frag-
ments of what might be called "ecological" or "structural" awareness
into the philosophical and legal scaffolds of an even braver new world.
For the sanctification of nature or of "natural principles," even if
achievable and even if effective in actually protecting natural sys-
tems, 00 would simply return us to the religious tradition that pre-
ceded transcendence, the tradition in which the divine, far from an
other-worldly essence, was immanent in all that is.107 It was the tra-
dition of immanence which was exemplified by the pantheistic belief
that all objects and places in the natural world possessed guardian
spirits demanding propitiation as security against unspeakable
harm. 1 To restore anything like pagan animism would be to risk
sanctifying the present, with all its faults and inadequacies. Treating
the existing order as sacred (or, in a secularized version of immanence,
as immutable) might well relegate to permanent subjugation and
101. See, e.g., Darling, Man's Responsibility for the Environment, in BIOLOGY AND
ETHICs 119 (F. Ebling ed. 1969).
102. Shils, The Sanctity of Life, ENCOUNTER, Jan. 1967, at 39, 41, 42.
103. See, e.g., N. BROWN, LIFE AGAINST DEATH 236 (1959); C. REICH, THE GREENING
OF AMERICA (1970); T. ROSZAK, WHERE THE WASTELAND ENDS (1972).
104. See, e.g., H. GARDNER, THE QUEST FOR MIND: PIAGET, LfvI-STRAUSS, AND TIHE
STRUCTURALIST MOVEMENT (1972). See also V. FERKIss, TECHNOLOGICAL MAN 245-72 (1969);
INTRODUCTION TO STRUCrURALISM (M. Lane ed. 1970).
105. It may have been a fusion of the romantic and the scientific strands of this
structuralist aspiration that inspired the oneness LUvi-Strauss glimpsed as the "essence
of life beyond thought and beyond society," revealed "in the wink of an eye, heavy
with patience, serenity and mutual forgiveness, that sometimes through an involuntary
understanding, one can exchange with a cat." C. Lgvi-STRAUSS, TRISTES TROPIQUES 479
(1955).
106. For an argument that "the belief that nature is sacred can tell against at-
tempts to preserve it," see Passmore, Removing the Rubbish, ENCOUNTER, Apr. 1974,
at 11, 13.
107. See generally R. BELLAH, Religious Evolution, in BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON
RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONAL WORLD, supra note 81, at 23, 27; H. WoLFSON, Spinoza
and the Religion of the Past, in RELIGIOUS PHiLoso'HY: A GROUP OF ESSAYS 24649 (1961).
108. See M. ELIADE, THE FORGE AND THE CRUCIBLE 99-100 (S. Corrin transl. 1962);
H. FRANKFORT, KINGSHIP AND THE GODS 342-44 (1948).
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deprivation those many who are not now among the privileged, freez-
ing the social evolution of humanity into its contemporary mold. It
would thus be as misguided to act on the premise that plastic trees
are "bad" simply because they are "unnatural" as I have argued it
would be mistaken to act as though there could be no objection to
plastic trees so long as persons have come to like them. Unless evolv-
ing human consciousness and will are recognized as legitimate and
indeed vital parts of the natural order, there can exist only sterility
and paralysis, negating all possibility of critique and progress.
D. A Possible Synthesis
To be free, it seems, is to choose what we shall value;109 to feel
coherence over time and community with others while experiencing
freedom is to choose in terms of shared commitments to principles
outside ourselves;110 but to make commitments without destroying
freedom is to live by principles that are capable of evolution as we
change in the process of pursuing them."' If transcendence degen-
erates ultimately into choice without commitment to principle and if
immanence ultimately disintegrates into principles incapable of
change, what must be sought is a synthesis of immanence with tran-
scendence"12-of sacred observer with grand manipulator. Such a syn-
thesis requires the sanctification neither of the present nor of prog-
ress 1 3 but of evolving processes of interaction and change-processes
of action and choice that are valued for themselves, for the concep-
tions of being that they embody, at the same time that they are valued
as means to the progressive evolution of the conceptions, experiences,
and ends that characterize the human community in nature at any
given point in its history. As those conceptions, experiences, and ends
evolve through the processes made possible by a legal and constitu-
tional framework for choice, the framework itself-the society's ideal-
ized conception of how change should be structured-may be expected
to change as well. One might think of the evolving framework as a
multidimensional spiral along which the society moves by successive
stages, according to laws of motion which themselves undergo gradual
109. See pp. 1326-27 supra.
110. See p. 1327 supra.
111. See pp. 1337-38 supra.
112. See Technology Assessment, supra note 23, at 659 n.143; cf. B. LONERGAN, METHOD
IN THEOLOGY 110-11 (1972).
113. Contemporary writers who seek to sanctify the very fact of change itself and
who call for heightened receptivity to change as such, see, e.g., D. SCHON, TECHNOLOGY
AND CHANCE 189-218 (1967); cf. D. SCHON, BEYOND THE STABLE STATE (1971); A. TOFFLER,
FUTURE SHOCK (1970), would, I fear, poison all hope of a successful union between the
conflicting poles of religious impulse. For sanctifying change as such escapes none of
the deepest evils of secular transcendence or of the moral vacuum it inspires.
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transformation as the society's position on the spiral, and hence its
character, changes. To avoid the spiral's premature closure upon any
necessarily tentative set of ideals and expectations, the framework for
choice must incorporate procedures for its own evolution. But the
framework for choice must begin somewhere, and, like all beginnings,
this one will seem, to some, to have come from no place. The only
solace must be Wittgenstein's: "Giving grounds [must] come to an end
sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: It is an
ungrounded way of acting." 11
4
The framework for choice to which I believe we should initially
commit ourselves must have a double aspect. Although it must be
selected in light of its likely consequences, it cannot be designed
simply to assure that the journey will bring us to some preconceived
destination. For no such destination is describable in advance, and
in no event could we expect a purely instrumental strategy to lib-
erate us from the grip of instrumentalism and manipulation in which
we feel trapped. The "way of acting" to which we commit ourselves
must therefore be a process valued in large part for its intrinsic quali-
ties rather than for its likely results. Such a conception of process
as more than instrumental should not seem wholly alien. In many
realms of human experience, process is intuitively and widely felt
to matter in itself: Kicking a dog is seen as different from tripping
over it; lynching an innocent victim is not thought to be the same
as erroneously convicting a person after a fair trial; there are respects
in which the sound of music produced by a computer cannot be
equated with the human enterprise of a living orchestra.115 In the
environmental area in particular, given the absence of any final sys-
tem of ends which either could or should command assent, we should
be capable of perceiving intrinsic significance-sanctity, if you will-
in the very principles, however variable, according to which we or-
chestrate our relationships with one another and with the physical
world of which we are a part.116
We do not begin, however, wholly without a conception of the
distant horizons toward which our processes will grope. Along those
horizons, at the very least, one must imagine that change will remain
114. L. WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY § 110 (G. Anscombe & G. von Wright eds. 1969).
115. See Policy Science, supra note 21, at 79-83.
116. This attribution of intrinsic significance to process cannot be achieved simply
by injecting procedural variables into instrumental analyses. Apart from the complex
circularity inherent in the fact that any analysis must become part of the process it
has helped to shape, see id. at 83, Technology Assessment, supra note 23, at 633 n.54,
any such strategy wrongly assumes that change can be achieved by thought alone and
simultaneously forgets that process must remain in part the end and not simply the
means.
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forever possible, and that no single conception or species will per-
petually dominate according to an iron rule. Partly because it seems
plausible to believe that the processes we embrace must from the
beginning prefigure something of that final vision if the vision itself
is to be approximated in history, and partly because any other start-
ing point would drastically and arbitrarily limit the directions in
which the spiral might evolve, it follows that the process with which
we start should avoid a premise of human domination, or indeed a
premise of the total subservience of any form of being to any other.
If the evolving processes we adopt are somehow to synthesize the
ideals of immanence with those of transcendence, it follows also that
those processes must embody a sense of reverence for whatever stands
beyond human manipulation and its willed consequences, as well
as a stance of criticism toward all that is given and a commitment
to the conscious improvement of the world. Such a synthesis, it should
be clear, must eventually cut across the received categories of "na-
ture" and "culture," for implicit in that classic dichotomy is a denial
of any possible union between the immanent and the transcendent.
It should not be distressing that this is so, and that traditional con-
ceptions of nature and of the natural will not suffice to capture the
necessary objects of our respect and of our sense of obligation. At
the most elementary level, after all, the impulse that is felt by many
as awe and respect for a vast canyon or a spider's web has much in
common with the sense of sanctity felt by others as they stand before
the structures at Stonehenge or the Cathedral at Chartres. What dif-
ferentiates a silent wilderness or a breathtaking monument from a
littered campground or a tornado-struck town cannot be summarized
in any facile contrast between the works of "man" and those of "na-
ture." To recognize that humanity is a part of nature and the natural
order a constituent part of humanity is to acknowledge that something
deeper and more complex than the customary polarities must be
articulated and experienced if the immanent and transcendent are
somehow to be united. At that crossroads, conceptions like harmony,
rootedness in history, connectedness with the future, all seem more
pertinent than the ultimately conventional concept of "the natural."
III. The First Turns of the Spiral
Like Schiller's mechanics who dare not let the wheels run down
while they repair "the living clockwork of the State,"'1n or Neurath's
117. F. SCHILLER, ON THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MAN 29 (Snell transl. 1954).
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sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea without discern-
ing its ideal design,"" we are condemned to toil in the dimmest light
as we feel our way toward the evolution of our conceptions and
ideals of the natural order. But if, as we have concluded,"19 the spiral
that traces such evolution is to reject human domination over other
modes of being, then at least its first turns seem within our grasp.
At a minimum, we must begin to extricate our nature-regarding
impulses from the conceptually oppressive sphere of human want
satisfaction, by encouraging the elaboration of perceived obligations
to plant and animal life and to objects of beauty'20 in terms that do
not falsify such perceptions from the very beginning by insistent
"reference to human interests.' 12' Thus environmental impact sur-
veys and statements might make explicit reference to obligations felt
toward nature. 122 Resources might be devoted to improving our
technical capacity to incorporate such felt obligations in policy analy-
ses. And legislation might be enacted to permit the bringing of
claims directly on behalf of natural objects without imposing the
requirement that such claims be couched in terms of interference
with human use.'
2-
A related proposal was recently advanced by Christopher Stone,
who suggested the appointment of guardians or trustees for objects
in the environment 24 as institutional embodiments of a perceived
obligation to treat the world about us with respect, and as symbols
of a recognition that persons are not the only entities in the world
that can be thought to possess rights. Despite the protests of some
that "man ...can have no duty to any being other than man,"' 25
and that, as a matter of "logic," only human beings can have
"rights,"' 20 the fact is that even our own legal system has long rec-
ognized entities other than individual human beings-churches, part-
118. Neurath, Protokollsiitze, 3 ERKENNTNIS 204, 206 (1932).
119. See pp. 1339-40 supra.
120. See id.
121. Passmore, supra note 106, at 19. Professor Passmore, it should be said, takes
the opposite view and insists that any ethic elaborating man's relation to land and to
the life it sustains be "justified by reference to human interests."
122. NEPA does not today provide a basis for agency determinations on such
grounds. On the contrary, policy sections are replete with phrases relating the Act's
purpose to human needs, although those needs may be long-range or broadly con-
ceived. Environmental values are expressed in such phrases as "the overall welfare and
development of man" (42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970)), "productive harmony" (id.), "trustee
of the environment for succeeding generations" (id. § 4331(b)(1)), "widest range of bene-
ficial uses of the environment without degradation" (id. § 4331(b)(3)), and "the main-
tenance and enhancement of long-term productivity" (id. § 4332(2)(C)(iv)) (emphasis
added). See also note 56 supra.
123. See p. 1317 supra.
124. See Stone, supra note 14.
125. I. KANT, supra note 61, § 16, at 105.
126. Passmore, supra note 106, at 19.
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nerships, corporations, unions, families, and occasionally even ani-
mals 127-as rights-holders for a wide variety of purposes. Acceptance
of the notion that some previously "rightless" entity enjoys legal
protection is largely a matter of acculturation. 128
Yet it remains true that treating a class of entities as rights-holders
is consistent with regarding their protected status as a mere juristic
convention. Thus, although American law has long accepted the
independent juridical status of corporations, no one would suggest
today that such entities are anything but legal constructs. No law
prohibits the death or dismemberment of corporations on the basis
of their intrinsic "right to life." No jurisprudence rationalizes the
127. A few courts have held that animals themselves enjoy rights under statutes
prohibiting animal cruelty. See, e.g., State v. Karstendiek, 49 La. 1621, 1624, 22 So.
845, 847 (1897). ("The statute [prohibiting cruelty to animals] is based on 'the theory,
unknown to the common law, that animals have rights which, like those of human
beings, are to be protected.' ") Perhaps the most eloquent expression of this view is
contained in an opinion written by a Mississippi judge in 1887:
Section 2918 of the Code, under which appellant was indicted, renders it a
criminal offence for any person to cruelly beat, abuse, starve, torture or purposely
injure certain animals, whether they belong to himself or another. This statute
is for the benefit of animals, as creatures capable of feeling and suffering, and it
was intended to protect them from cruelty, without reference to their being
property, or to the damages which might thereby be occasioned to their owners
[S]peaking for myself, I wish to say, that laws and the enforcement or ob-
servance of laws for the protection of dumb brutes from cruelty are, in my
judgment, among the best evidences of the justice and benevolence of men. Such
statutes were not intended to interfere, and do not interfere, with the necessary
discipline and government of such animals, or place any unreasonable restriction
on their use or the enjoyment to be derived from their possession. The common
law recognized no right in such animals, and punished no cruelty to them, ex-
cept in so far as it affected the right of individuals to such property. Such
statutes remedy this defect, and exhibit the spirit of that Divine law, which is
so mindful of dumb brutes as to teach and command not to muzzle the ox when
he treadeth out the corn-not to plough with an ox and an ass together-not take
the bird that sitteth on its young, or its eggs, and not to seethe a kid in its
mother's milk. To disregard the rights and feelings of equals is unjust and un-
generous, but to wilfully or wantonly injure or oppress the weak and helpless is
mean and cowardly. Human beings have at least some means of protecting them.
selves against the inhumanity of man-that inhumanity which "makes countless
thousands mourn," but dumb brutes have none. Cruelty to them manifests a vicious
and degraded nature, and it tends inevitably to cruelty to men. Animals whose
lives are devoted to our use and pleasure, and which are capable, perhaps, of
feeling as great physical pain or pleasure as ourselves, deserve for these con-
siderations alone, kindly treatment. The dominion of man over them, if not a moral
trust, has a better significance than the development of malignant passions and
cruel instincts. Often their beauty, gentleness and fidelity suggest the reflection,
that it may have been one of the purposes of- their creation and subordination
to enlarge the sympathies and expand the better feelings of our race. But, how-
ever this may be, human beings should be kind and just to dumb brutes, if for
no other reason than to learn how to be kind and just to each other.
Stephens v. State, 65 Miss. 329, 330-32, 3 So. 458-59 (1887) (Arnold, J.).
128. See Stone, supra note 14, at 453-56. Arguing for "rights" on behalf of nonhuman
entities should not be confused with suggesting that certain nonhuman interests should
have absolute priority over conflicting human claims; recognizing rights in a previously
rightless entity is entirely consistent with acknowledging circumstances in which such
rights might be overridden, just as human rights may themselves come into conflict.
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validity of corporate law in terms of "just" propitiation of the en-
dogenous needs or wants of corporate entities. 12 9 It seems likely that
contemporary observers would view the independent legal status of
environmental objects in essentially the same way that they view
the concept of corporate existence. Affording legal rights to endan-
gered species and threatened wilderness areas might thus be regarded
as a convenient technique for concentrating congeries of otherwise
diffuse aesthetic and ecological concerns ultimately reducible to hu-
man interest-in other words, as a useful but quite transparent legal
fiction.
Even if this were the most one could hope for, the concept of rights
for natural objects would probably represent a valuable doctrinal
innovation. Whatever unnecessary threat the "standing" requirement
continues to pose to effective environmental action would be
avoided. 130 And procedural devices far less cumbersome than class
actions would become available for challenging environmental
abuses.'31
But we might plausibly hope for more. At least so long as we re-
main within empathizing distance of the objects whose rights we seek
to recognize, it seems reasonable to expect the acknowledgment of
such rights to be regarded as more than fictitious. Thus, protecting
cats and dogs from torture on the basis of their desire to be free from
pain and hence their right not to be mistreated seems less jarring
conceptually than protecting a forest from clear-cutting on the theory
that the threatened trees have an inherent "right to life."
It is not surprising that one of the few pieces of existing federal
law aimed unambiguously at protecting nonhuman interests-the
Federal Laboratory Animal Welfare Act132-imits its protection to
mammals, whose perceptions of pain and discomfort we presume to
129. The legal protection afforded corporations is typically viewed as justifiable
only insofar as it serves individual human needs. See, e.g., Rostow, To Whom and
For What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN
SocIE-n' 63-71 (E. Mason ed. 1959). See generally J. RAwas, supra note 63, at 265-74.
130. Under current standing doctrine, a plaintiff cannot challenge an activity as
injurious to the environment unless he has suffered or is likely to suffer personal
harm as a result thereof. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686-89 (1973).
131. For instance, administratively appointed guardians could bring actions to en-
force the rights of environmental objects. See generally Stone, supra note 14, at 464-73.
132. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-55 (1970). See also the Endangered Species Conservation Act
of 1969, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668aa-668cc-5 (1970); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 42(c) (1970) ("The Secretary of
the Treasury shalI prescribe such requirements and issue such permits as he may
deem necessary for the transportation of wild animals and birds under humane and
healthful conditions, and it shall be unlawful for any person, including any importer,
knowingly to cause or permit any wild animal or bird to be transported to the
United States, or any Territory or district thereof, under inhumane or unhealthful
conditions or in violation of such requirements.").
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be similar to our own.133 In addition to supporting a general hypothe-
sis that the needs of creatures close to man on the evolutionary scale
are easier to assimilate into contemporary value systems than are the
needs of our more distant relatives, the legislative history of the 1970
amendments to the Act also, provides a graphic illustration of the
process of anthropomorphic validation: The House committee report
proclaims that the purpose of the legislation is to ensure that animals
are "accorded the basic creature comforts of adequate housing, ample
food and water, reasonable handling, decent sanitation . .. and ade-
quate veterinary care including the appropriate use of pain-killing
drugs .... -134 The statutory terms reveal an obvious transference
of human values to the nonhuman rights-holders: The words "com-
fort," "decent sanitation" and indeed "pain" refer to human experi-
ences and perceptions. By incorporating such terms into legislation
protecting animals, the draftsmen are equating the perceptions of
animals with those of humans; the terminology subliminally rein-
forces our sympathy for the plight of mistreated animals by evoking
images of human suffering. As a result, the propriety of legal pro-
tection in the interest of the animals themselves becomes more
apparent.
As the evolutionary distance between man and nonhuman rights-
holders increases, the difficulty of analogizing to human experiences
mounts. Torturing a dog evokes a strong sympathetic response; dis-
membering a frog produces a less acute but still unambiguous image
of pain; even pulling the wings off a fly may cause a sympathetic
twinge; but who would flinch at exterminating a colony of protozoa?
When legal protection is sought for plant life, the obstacles to con-
vincing analogy are greater still. Yet even here the prospects are not
altogether hopeless. Humans share certain fundamental needs with
plants. Humans and plants both require water, oxygen and nutri-
tion; both grow and reproduce; both die. A set of basic reference
points for analogizing plant requirements to human needs thus exists.
Some research even suggests that plants exhibit electrical and chem-
ical reactions which are functionally analogous to pain. 3 5 And, once
133. See 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (1970). The Act's protection is expressly limited to warm-
blooded animals. The animals which are covered in the absence of a specific de-
termination by the Secretary of Agriculture are common household pets-cats, dogs,
hamsters-and widely used experimental subjects such as monkeys, guinea pigs and
rabbits. Id.
134. H.R. REP. No. 1651, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970) (emphasis added). For the
1970 amendments themselves, see Act of Dec. 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560.
135. See, e.g., Backster, Evidence of a Primary Perception in Plant Life, 10 INT'L
J. PARAPSYCHOLOGY 329 (1968); Lawrence, Plants Have Feelings, Too, ORGANIC GARDEN-
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the bases for empathy are thus established, biologists and ecologists
can obviously enrich our understanding of what "needs" exist for the
other life forms with whom we have begun to feel new kinship. 30
What is crucial to recognize is that the human capacity for em-
pathy and identification is not static; the very process of recognizing
rights in those higher vertebrates with whom we can already empa-
thize could well pave the way for still further extensions as we move
upward along the spiral of moral evolution. It is not only the human
liberation movements-involving first blacks, then women, and now
children-that advance in waves of increased consciousness. The inner
dynamic of every assault on domination is an ever broadening realiza-
tion of reciprocity and identity. Viewed from a slightly different
perspective, new possibilities for respect and new grounds for com-
munity elevate both master and slave simultaneously, reaffirming
the truth that the oppressor is among the first to be liberated when
he lifts the yoke, that freedom can be realized only in fidelity to
obligation.
A passage in Faulkner's Absalom, Absalom! may hold the key:
"Maybe happen is never once but like ripples maybe on water after
the pebble sinks, the ripples moving on, spreading, the pool attached
by a narrow umbilical water-cord to the next pool . . . ." 13But there
are some shores too remote for even these concentric circles to reach
in the foreseeable future. When it is urged that legal protection be
extended to nonliving entities like canyons and cathedrals, not for our
sake but for theirs, it may be precisely such distant shores at which
we are asked to gaze. Saint Francis of Assisi could embrace Brother
Fire and Sister Water, 138 but Western societies in the last third of this
century may be unable to entertain seriously the notion that a moun-
tain or a seashore has intrinsic needs and can make independent
moral claims upon our designs.
ING & FARMING, Apr. 1971, at 64; Woodlief, Royster & Huang, Effect of Random Noise
on Plant Growth, 46 J. ACOUSTICAL Soc'Y AM. 481 (1969). See also Stone, supra note
14, at 479 n.93.
136. The bases of such perceived kinship need not be confined to data about in-
dividual members of a species but may embrace new understandings of how other
orders of life organize themselves as groups. See, e.g., J. LAnVwCK-GooDALL, THE
BEHAVIOR OF FREE-LIVING CHIMPANZEES IN THE GomE STREAM RESERVE 211-16, 257-93
(1968). Goodall's research shows, inter alia, that chimpanzee "[g]roup activity is sub-
ject to control by leaders," id. at 213, and that "[r]elations between individuals are
affected by the dominance hierarchy ...." Id. at 257.
137. W. FAULKNER, ABSALOM, ABSALOM. 261 (Vintage ed. 1972).
138. ST. FRANCIS OF Assisi, The Canticle of The Sun, in WRITINGS 153 (P. Robinson
transl. 1906). ("Praised be my Lord for sister water,/The which is greatly helpful and
humble and precious and pure./Praised be my Lord for brother fire,/By which Thou
lightest up the dark./And fair is he and gay and mighty and strong.')
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Still we can try. We can set aside resources and create public au-
thorities for the specific purpose of preserving intact at least some
major areas of real wilderness while we convert others into more
Walt Disney Worlds and Coney Islands. The very process of treating
some places with such respect may itself reveal and even create con-
ceptual possibilities beyond our present capacities. 139 If, as I have
argued elsewhere, 140 certain choices do not merely implement but
radically alter the value systems within which they are made, then
choosing to accord nature a fraternal rather than an exploited role
-even when the resulting institutions resolve in particular cases not
to forego certain human opportunities "for nature's sake"-might
well make us different persons from the manipulators and subju-
gators we are in danger of becoming.
Conclusion
I have described only a possible-I think a plausible-first turn
along the spiral of process through which we might grope toward an
evolving environmental ethic. I certainly do not claim that I have
described an answer. Indeed, the first step has already exposed its
own weakness in its inability to deal adequately with the notion that
nonliving nature exists for itself. But it is at this juncture that the
profound significance of devotion to process should become apparent.
The vision of process I have sought to sketch transcends the inter-
mediate stances of consciousness achieved at discrete points along
the spiral's path. Its insistence on the continuing reformulation and
evolution of the principles distilled from it at each stage provides a
way of not only bridging the gap between successive stages but also
energizing the journey through a commitment to overcome the in-
evitable inadequacies at each stage. Thus consciousness remains in
a double stance: While vigorously living out the values provided by
the present stage, we remain aware of the fact that these values them-
selves pass through evolutionary stages whose unfolding we participate
in and sanctify. All I have said, therefore, has been written rather
more in the subjunctive than in the indicative.
139. See, e.g., D. RUDHYAR, DIRECTIVES FOR NEW LIFE 21-23 (1971) (suggestion that
the earth is a total "organism" in which mankind plays the role of articulating a
planetary consciousness).
140. Technology Assessment, supra note 23, at 640.
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Upon that cautionary note, it is appropriate to recall this essay's
governing metaphor: The plastic trees of Los Angeles are tangible
symbols of a view of nature which coincides with the currently myopic
premises of environmental law and policy. The trees represent nature
abstracted to pure categories of human need: They provide shade,
decoration and the aesthetic semblance of a natural environment.
What's wrong with plastic trees? The question can be answered
only tentatively, but I have responded by expressing an ethical im-
pulse toward nature which is irreducible to terms of sophisticated
self-interest. It is an impulse I believe we violate when we use "nature
surrogates" to conceal the wounds we inflict on the natural order,
thereby anesthetizing our aesthetic and ecological sensibilities. Even
the seemingly innocuous act of supplementing the inadequacies of
nature with human artifacts-erecting plastic trees where the soil is
too poor or shallow or the atmosphere too fouled to support real
vegetation-may transgress the imperatives of an emerging environ-
mental ethic. Much like black lawn boy statuary defacing too many
suburban yards, plastic trees implicitly reduce the entities they por-
tray to terms of serviceability, utility and adornment. And such cari-
catures in turn reinforce the belief that the depicted objects exist
not for themselves but only to serve superior needs.
What is required, I have argued, is a rejection of this philosophy,
itself a legacy of an anti-worldly, transcendent conception of the uni-
verse, but without a return to the immanent conception in which the
natural was worshipped and human consciousness excluded from the
vital place I believe it must always occupy. If this article's argument
for a synthesis of the immanent with the transcendent has seemed to
tilt toward immanence, it has done so largely in reaction to the almost
obsessive devotion in our time to a secularized version of the tran-
scendent, in which human will and instrumental reason have become
the engine of a pilotless locomotive, hurtling through a terrain de-
void of intrinsic value.
Shortly after World War II, Horkheimer asked us to imagine what
a purely formal mode of reason in a valueless environment would
ultimately mean:
We cannot maintain that the pleasure a man gets from a land-
scape . . . would last long if he were convinced a priori that
the forms and colors he sees are just forms and colors, that all
structures in which they play a role are purely subjective and
have no relation whatsoever to any meaningful order or totality,
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that they simply and necessarily express nothing. . No walk
through the landscape is necessary any longer; and thus the very
concept of landscape as experienced by a pedestrian becomes
meaningless and arbitrary. Landscape deteriorates altogether
into landscaping.141
What mind can resist despair at such a prospect? Who can fail to
admit that the homocentric logic of self-interest leads finally not to
human satisfaction but to the loss of humanity?
141. M. HORKHEIMER, supra note 59, at 37-38.
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